The mushrooming number of states aft er the disintegration of multinational federations in Europe and Asia has revived the study of "building," "constructing," or "imagining" national and ethnic identities. Similar to nationalism, which James Mayall identifi ed as a black box "into which whatever cannot be explained in any other way . . . can be fi led away without further consideration," nation building and national identities cannot be grasped by a single general theory.
fertile empirical soil for applying and understanding this new approach to Brubaker's model. The ways in which ethnicity and nation have been shaped in the post-Yugoslav space reveal that they are indeed not "things in the world" but "perspectives on the world."
6
The conception of the nation in Montenegro, a country of less than seven hundred thousand inhabitants and one of the newest post-Yugoslav states, has undergone signifi cant change. The politics and history of Montenegro in general have been studied by a mere handful of scholars outside the Balkan region, and only a few academic eff orts have dealt with national identity.
7
This study fi lls this gap by looking exclusively at those policies that have had an impact on identity reconstruction in Montenegro. While not denigrating the signifi cance of historical analysis, references to the country's history are made only if and when they became inseparable from policies. In other words, the analysis does not follow a historical logic or present events and processes in the order in which they happened. Rather, in line with the conceptual background and methodological approach being used, I examine those issues which have proven to be salient for the reconstruction of Montenegrin identity.
In this context, it is important to note that between the time of the breakup of Yugoslavia, in the early 1990s, and mid-2006, Montenegro held two referenda and three population censuses. Their results indicate a change in what it means to be "Montenegrin." category of "Montenegrin." Montenegrin independence was supported by 55.5 percent of the 86.5 percent voter turnout and opposed by 44.5 percent.
11
Correlating these data with the results of the 2003 census, wherein 43.2 percent of the people in Montenegro declared their national identity as Montenegrin and 32 percent as Serb, we can infer a polarization of what was considered Montenegrin in the early 1990s. 12 With minorities favoring independence in 2006, these data indicate that the lion's share of the population who supported the preservation of the joint state defi ned themselves as Serb, and the majority of those who voted for independence as Montenegrins.
13
The most recent census, conducted fi ve years aft er Montenegro became independent, revealed that the categories of Serb and Montenegrin, comprising 28.7 percent and 45 percent of the population, respectively, have continued to be reshaped by the new political context.
14
The aim of my research is to shed light on the changes in the meaning of Montenegrin identity and the mechanisms through which such change has been catalyzed into the aforementioned "moments of collective eff ervescence." The Serb category both in-and outside Montenegro was also signifi cantly nationalized during the period under scrutiny, but this complex issue falls beyond the scope of the present study. Examples of this process can be found in analyses of the confl icts in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as in work on Serbian politics before and aft er Slobodan Milošević and in the more recent research on Montenegro.
15
In turn, focusing on the smallest post-Yugoslav state, this article argues that despite the signifi cant changes in the content of Montenegrin identity, the policies that the government adopted within its nation-building project have proven only partly successful. To support this thesis, I examine popular support for the policies that have helped reconstruct Montenegrin identity aft er the disintegration of socialist Yugoslavia, focusing on the symbolic reconstruction of identity parameters in Montenegro aft er the split of the ruling party in 1997. By examining original quantitative and qualitative data, my analysis associates the divide related to the question of statehood with perceptions of identity, showing how the content of "Montenegrin" self-identifi cation changed as a result of people's support for or opposition to independence. 
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The qualitative sources used, including conceptual and historical literature, newspaper articles, and legal texts, provide a contextualizing background for the empirical analysis, which is based on a survey conducted from 31 August to 18 September 2011 as part of the project "Symbolic Nation-Building in the West Balkans."
16 The sample size for the Montenegro survey was 1,516 respondents. While the survey dataset included a total of 89 questions, I pre sent here only those issues that have proven statistically relevant for the analysis of how policies adopted by the government changed Montenegrins' identity frames.
17
However, as with any quantitative dataset, the survey is not perfect; consequently, some issues cannot be examined in the present study. In particular, there is a lack of detailed analysis of non-Montenegrins and non-Serbs, as the only other ethnic category named in the survey were "Muslims" (which included those who identifi ed as Muslim and Bosniak). Due to the fact that Albanians and Croats in Montenegro form 5 percent and 1 percent, respectively, of the overall population, these groups were included separately in the Ipsos dataset but have been classifi ed under "Other."
18
Hence, a separate analysis of these minorities is not possible in this study and falls beyond its scope.
In terms of structure, the fi rst part of the article develops the framework for understanding nation building in this small post-Yugoslav state by viewing national identity as an abstract category. Here I draw on Brubaker's concept of the schema, which is a cognitive frame through which individuals ascribe themselves to groups.
19
Schemas consist of a core (which is less subject to change) and a periphery (composed of elements subject to alteration in different circumstances), and they provide tools helpful for understanding the cognition of the nation. The second part of the article is empirical, focusing on Montenegro's nation-building policies. In viewing national identity as a political frame, I assess the success of policies aimed at nation building by examining popular support for them in the context of the offi cial rhetoric of what the category of Montenegrin entails. This, however, does not imply a departure from Brubaker's criticism of "groupism," as the analyzed category is considered heterogeneous. Rather, my analysis supports the idea that concepts like nation and ethnicity can be understood only by looking at the framing of abstract cognitive categories through specifi c, institutionalized practices.
Understanding Nation Building in Montenegro
Nation building has long been a part of the major puzzle in social and political studies. Nation building assumes an understanding of the ever-changing 16. University of Oslo, Department of Literature, Area Studies and European Languages, "Strategies of Symbolic Nation-Building in West Balkan States," at www.hf.uio. no/ilos/english/research/projects/nation-w-balkan/ (last accessed 1 February 2014). Ipsos Strategic Marketing, "Report: Nation Building-Montenegro," at www.hf.uio.no/ilos/ forskning/prosjekter/nation-w-balkan/dokumenter/nb_montenegro.pdf (last accessed 1 February 2014).
17. conceptions of national identity in a given polity, be it a state, a state-like entity, or a subnational or supranational polity.
20 National identity is best analyzed through two, partly overlapping, frames: cognitive and relational. First, national identity is cognitive and thus exists at the individual level. As such, it is related to the ways in which individuals realize their own national belonging and establish cognitive schemas. In turn, these schemas are essential for the self-ascription of the individuals to the perceived national group, whose boundaries are individually established and thus changeable. Second, national identity is endogenously and exogenously relational, in that it implies the assumption of "groupness" among its members and the interaction of such a group as a collectivity with other groups.
Nation building is the process of harmonizing the boundaries of the state and those of national identity. It thus implies the framing of individual cognition as belonging to a perceived collective on the grounds of commonalities such as language, culture, religion, and so on. 21 At the same time, nation building presumes the creation of associative ties among the members of the group (endogenous relationalism) and the diff erentiation of that group from others of the same kind by constructing cognitive boundaries acceptable to the individual members of a perceived nation (exogenous relationalism). The interconnectedness of these processes can help explain nation building in Montenegro, where groupism has evolved over time. This process has taken place both at the individual level, whereby the cognitive understanding of the nation was altered, and at the level of the group, which has sought to materialize itself in various ways, changing its relations with other groups.
Nation Building through Alternating Cognitive Frames: Diff erent Cognitions of the Nation
Cognition of the nation in Montenegro has indisputably changed since 1991. During the wars of Yugoslavia's disintegration (1991-96), Montenegro sided with Serbia, providing individuals with a cognitive frame for imagining and understanding the nation. Montenegrin nationalism fl ourished under the umbrella of Milošević's politics, with only a small portion of the population demanding outright independence.
22
The categories of Montenegrin and Serbian in Montenegro were largely interchangeable and denoted belonging to the Montenegrin republic of Yugoslavia. Moreover, both of these categories were affi liated with Orthodox Christianity. 
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the respondents (that is, the total of the two categories) declared themselves to be Orthodox Christians.
24
In 1997 there was a disruption of the cognitive frame for understanding the meaning of being Montenegrin, one that can be attributed largely to the end of the republic's monolithic political system. At that time, the ruling party of reformed communists-the Democratic Party of Socialists (Demokratska Partija Socijalista, DPS), which had captured most of the popular vote-split into two factions of almost equal size. Prime Minister Milo Đukanović discontinued the DPS's support for Milošević, a move opposed by the then president of Montenegro, Momir Bulatović.
25
Continuing to be politically linked to Milošević, in 1998 Bulatović established the Socialist People's Party (Socijalistička narodna partija, SNP), which has been the major opposition party in Montenegro ever since (apart from 2006 to 2009, when the Serbian People's Party held one more seat in parliament than the SNP). Aft er the demise of the Milošević regime, in 2000, the internal Montenegrin debate needed a diff erent political spin and thus provided another cognitive frame for nation building. The overall political discourse was marked by the Đukanović government's intensifi ed demands for independence. The confl ict among the political elites affected the people of Montenegro, who gradually embraced the ideas professed by the DPS or the SNP. As a result, internal political struggles progressively generated two opposing political stances: pro-independence and pro-union. By the 2003 census, Montenegrin and Serbian schemas had become defi ned by political agendas and tied to the debate over Montenegrin statehood. The Serb category in Montenegro became related to Serb Orthodox Christianity, the joint state with Serbia, and opposition to Đukanović. The Montenegrin identity category was linked to support for independence and what were perceived as western values, like pro-democracy rhetoric and European Union integration. The Montenegrin category also lost its religious appeal because the category now included religious minorities.
This marriage of ethnicity and politics became embodied in two competing national identities, with nationalization of the identity schema(s) at the heart of the processes described above. This shift ed the cognitive frame of national identity, allowing people to ascribe themselves to one with an alternate label, thus enabling changes in the contents of the Montenegrin and Serb identity categories in the two decades following the Yugoslav disintegration.
Reconstruction of the "Montenegrin" Identity Schema: Identifi cation versus Diff erentiation
Eric Hobsbawm once drew an analogy between the role of history in nationalist movements and that of poppy fl owers in heroin use. and events in and of themselves are largely detached from present-day realities. They are raw material for nationalist ideologies, just like poppies for drug abuse. Hence, only when history has been processed and reproduced in national narratives do those events become a part of the way in which individuals see themselves in terms of belonging to a group and relating to other groups. Reference to past events becomes essential in the imagining of the nation because individuals build a sense of group continuity and affi liation on the grounds of history. Three points are particularly relevant here and help diff erentiate the dynamics of identity and statehood in Montenegro from those of other former Yugoslav republics. First, Montenegro's small size has been a signifi cant factor in rearticulating what it meant to be Montenegrin. Given that the country's population amounts to only slightly more than six hundred thousand, the dynamics of sociopolitical organization there diff er from those in other post-Yugoslav republics. Social relations are dense, due to the high degree of personal and family connections, which has commonly been related to the extremely high rates of party membership.
27
The articulation of the Montenegrin schema became particularly relevant in this regard aft er 1997, when the DPS-led coalition based a share of its grievances on the asymmetry of population and territory in the common state with Serbia.
28
In turn, these grievances had greater resonance with the people due to their strong affi liations with political parties.
Second, throughout its history, identity in Montenegro has been dualistic: Serb and Montenegrin had not been mutually exclusive categories, a situation referred to as the Montenegrin homo duplex.
29
This fact is particularly relevant for understanding the two competing streams of identity aft er Đukanović's embrace of the independence project. Historically, affi liation with Orthodox Christianity denoted association with the Serb category. Montenegrin rulers were at one time also the highest authority in the national Orthodox Church and were referred to as "prince-bishops" until the separation of the church from the state leadership in 1852. Thus, for several centuries religious and state rule emanated from a single nexus. This closeness, which became the core of the identity schema, resonated in the historical ambiguity over Montenegrin identity. In particular, the Petrović prince-bishops Petar I and Petar II referred to the population as "Serb," which resulted in two distinct interpretations of identity in Montenegro that have persisted up to the present day-as Montenegrin and Serb. identity meant has become an important aspect of the identity schema's periphery in recent decades. In the early 1990s, due to the association of Montenegro's ruling elites with the Serbian nationalist movement, prevailing perceptions of the Montenegrin category were associated with (Serb) Orthodox Christianity. 31 The tendency of the ruling elites to dissociate from (Serb) Orthodox Christianity as a prevalent marker of national identity was initiated aft er the party split in 1997. Due to the Đukanović camp's need to attract minority votes in order to ensure electoral victories, the reconstruction of the Montenegrin identity schema required detachment from the religious strand-which had been associated with animosity toward Islam and Roman Catholicism during the Yugoslav wars-and thus a detachment from the Serb category.
32
Hence, the Montenegrin identity schema became less ascriptive through religious affi liation, as its boundaries expanded to include the adherents of several religions.
Third, an important marker in the reconstruction of the meaning of being Montenegrin was diff erentiation through the tension between the history of Montenegro's independent statehood and its membership in Yugoslavia. Throughout its history Montenegro existed as a separate, autonomous regional entity, which, alongside Serbia, gained international recognition at the 1878 Congress of Berlin. In 1918 Montenegro joined Serbia in what became the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. In light of Brubaker's theory, this could be regarded a major event that changed the nature of the identity schema, altering the cognitive frame through which categories of belonging were perceived. The kingdom, renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1928, functioned as a unitary state, detaching Montenegrin identity from the territory of Montenegro. In the fi rst Yugoslavia, national categories were related to the Serb, Croat, and Slovene "tribes," a fact which has in recent years been refl ected in the contested elements of identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia.
33
These latter three constituent parts of Yugoslavia were recognized in the second, post-World War II Yugoslavia as separate republics. Hence, Montenegrin identity developed within the Yugoslav federal frame, which since 1946 had acknowledged the existence of fi ve nations that for the most part lived within the borders of the constituent republics. the union of Montenegro and Serbia. In 1991, by contrast, the drive for Montenegrin independence was rather weak and included only the Liberal Alliance of Montenegro (Liberalni Savez Crne Gore, LSCG) and minority parties, which comprised less than a quarter of the electorate.
35
It is safe to assume that, aside from the very small share of people who supported Montenegrin independence in 1991, interest in the preservation of the joint state with Serbia by default formed a part of both Montenegrin and Serb identities in 1991. Hence, those people whose identity was both Montenegrin and Serbian in 1991 (the homo duplex) likely related ethnic categories to their attitudes toward Montenegrin independence in 2003.
Institutionalized Nation Building: How "Montenegrin" Changed through Policies
The reconstruction of identity schemas does not occur in a vacuum. It is a product of a complex interaction between political and societal forces that act as sets of opportunities for and constraints on one another. In Montenegro the ruling political elites dominated the discourse related to the conception of the nation. The reconstruction of the Montenegrin schema's meaning was initiated during the period of opposition to Milošević through policies that detached Montenegro from the federal institutions. These policies, which entailed the establishment of separate customs, visa regulations, citizenship requirements, monetary policy, and the unilateral adoption of the deutschmark as Montenegro's offi cial currency, have been referred to as "creeping independence."
36
The initial goal of the DPS's "creeping independence" was neither independent statehood nor the institutionalization of a Montenegrin national identity. Rather, this set of policies served to support Đukanović's separation from Milošević and to localize the political struggles between the DPS and the SNP.
37
Yet, by 2000 this creeping independence had resulted in Montenegro's high degree of detachment from the federal institutions. It provided a push for Đukanović's turn toward independence aft er the fall of Milošević. In the period from 2001 to 2006, marked by tense political struggles between proponents and opponents of Montenegrin independence, the ruling DPS introduced a further set of policies, aimed at reinforcing the independence idea by associating it with the Montenegrin schema. As the political camp led by the DPS consisted of ethnically heterogeneous groups, representations of a Montenegrin identity were based on the rhetoric of a "civic" nation-that is, the link with the state rather than with a community of like sentiment. Still, as indicated by survey results presented later in this article, these policies did not result in a Montenegrin identity schema with a predominant association with the state instead of ethnic affi liation. Rather, this schema was associated with affi liation with political parties, predominantly the ruling DPS.
38
However, the reconstruction of this Montenegrin schema involved more than political elements: the process entailed a separation from Serb ethnic identity. Several policies adopted by the DPS government aft er 2001 aimed at introducing ethnic elements into the identity schema. These policies, analyzed in the fi nal section of this article, are related to the reconstruction of nationhood through language and the symbols of the state. Another signifi cant element of the policies that altered the meaning of the Montenegrin schema is the detachment of the ruling elites from the Serbian Orthodox Church, which they had largely supported in the early 1990s.
39

Political Elements of Nation Building
The reconstruction of Montenegrin nationhood between 2001 and 2006 took place in a political environment marked by a tense struggle between parties advocating and opposing the independence project. Identifi cation with a political party became a salient component of the Montenegrin and Serb schemas. In the 2011 survey, 68 percent of the respondents said they were affi liated with a political party, and 73 percent of those who saw themselves as Montenegrin supported the ruling DPS. By contrast, respondents who considered themselves Serb tended to support the former members of the pro-union camp, represented by the SNP and the New Serb Democracy party (Nova srpska demokratija, or NOVA)-42 percent and 34 percent, respectively)-whereas very little of the Montenegrin vote went to those parties (only 5 percent and 1 percent to the SNP and NOVA, respectively). This is further confi rmation that the Montenegrin identity schema was reconstructed so as to align with the political program of the ruling DPS.
In addition to party affi liation, identifi cation with the state is another political element in the reconstruction of the Montenegrin identity schema. Unlike in countries with a predominantly civic identity, in Montenegro identifi cation with the state has a dual meaning. On the one hand, support for the state implies affi liation with the political project of independence. Thus, 73 percent of those who saw themselves as Montenegrins identifi ed strongly with Montenegro, which is equivalent to the support of the Montenegrin category for the ruling DPS.
40 Moreover, 95 percent of these respondents were proud to be citizens of their country.
41
On the other hand, Montenegrin identity did not preclude the civic element in terms of respondents' views on whether Montenegro is a multiethnic and multicultural country. Further political elements of Montenegrin identity were established at the time of the divide over statehood and identity and reinforced aft er the country became independent in 2006. These include attitudes toward military service, stances toward various international actors, and views on national holidays. Although these elements were initially at the periphery of the Montenegrin identity schema, by becoming politicized by the ruling elites as elements of DPS policy they emerged as prominent markers of the reconstructed Monte- negrin identity, as diff erentiated from the Serb one. However, they were somewhat less successful than the elements directly related to the ruling elites' campaign for independence.
During the 1999 Kosovo crisis the Montenegrin authorities adopted a decision to pardon conscripts who refused the federal call to fi ght in the war. This was intended to distance Montenegro from Milošević's Serbia. The link between the state and military service was further highlighted in the 2002 Belgrade Agreement, which stipulated that conscripts would be allowed to do military service in their member state, confi rming this policy through the constitutional setup of the transformed joint state of Montenegro and Serbia. In both the second and the third Yugoslav governments, conscripts had served in a member state other than their own-a mechanism intended to foster a sense of loyalty to the federation rather than to their ethnic kin. In August 2006, a few months aft er becoming an independent state, Montenegro abolished conscription, a policy supported by 53 percent of those who identifi ed as Montenegrin and 34 percent of those who identifi ed as Serb.
44
Part of the explanation for the limited public support for this policy lies in the historical narratives about Montenegro which highlight the militancy, "heroism and glory" of Montenegrins in their struggles against the Ottoman empire. disintegration. According to Florian Bieber, it was the narrative of "heroism and glory," coupled with the government's war propaganda, that induced the "enthusiastic participation of the Montenegrin soldiers and reservists" in the JNA's attacks on Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
46
As a consequence of these narratives and of the fact that Montenegro was closely aligned with Serbia in the early 1990s, supporting Milošević's expansionist policies, we also fi nd polarized attitudes toward policies related to the issue of war crimes. Some 45 percent of self-identifi ed Montenegrins supported the apology for war crimes that President Đukanović made to Croatia in 2000. Although not having majority support, the policy of apologizing for war crimes clearly demarcated those who identifi ed as Montenegrin from those who identifi ed as Serb, given that only 13 percent of the latter supported it.
47
The data on people's attitudes toward the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), cooperation with which is an offi cial policy of Montenegro, are similar. While 46 percent of Montenegrins supported cooperation with the ICTY, only 13 percent of Serbs did so.
48
Similarly, 30 percent of Serbs believed that working with the ICTY is negative for Montenegrin sovereignty, and an equal percentage saw this cooperation as harmful for Montenegro's national interests. Only 13 percent of Montenegrins deemed the cooperation with the ICTY damaging for the country's sovereignty, while 11 percent of Montenegrins shared the belief that it would adversely aff ect national interests.
49
Although these policies related to war crimes issues were not supported by an overwhelming majority of those who ascribe themselves to the Montenegrin schema, they show a clear split in attitudes between them and those who consider themselves Serbs. As these policies were adopted at the time of the divide over statehood and identity, their primary aim was to distance Montenegro from the federation and from Serbia. Gradually, however, by being included in the political aspect of the Montenegrin identity schema they became indicators of how groupism evolved in this small Balkan state.
The polarization created by creeping independence has also aff ected attitudes toward the country's foreign policy among those who saw themselves as Montenegrin. Aft er 1997 the ruling DPS oriented itself toward the west in order to receive fi nancial and logistical support in the struggle against Milošević. From 1997 to 2000 the United States and the EU gave Montenegro notable financial assistance as "a tribute to the role being played by Montenegro in the eff ort to build a free and democratic Yugoslavia."
50 In subsequent years, and especially aft er the independence referendum, the ruling Montenegrin elites promoted EU integration as their main foreign policy objective.
51
In this con- text, although 69.9 percent of the surveyed Montenegrin population reported that they generally considered EU integration as a good thing, opinions toward main foreign policy allies varied. Similar to the case of attitudes toward war crimes, these opinions have become another marker of the Montenegrin identity schema. Within this identity category, 40 percent of those surveyed saw the EU as the country's main foreign policy ally, while the United States was cited by only 18 percent. This attitude is another marker of diff erentiation from the Serb schema, wherein only 13 percent and 10 percent saw the EU and the United States, respectively, as Montenegro's main foreign policy allies. The majority of those who saw themselves as Serbs (53 percent) perceived their kin-state of Serbia as Montenegro's main foreign policy ally, whereas only 20 percent of the self-identifi ed Montenegrins did so.
52
Another politically shaped marker of the change in the identity schema in Montenegro is refl ected in attitudes toward state holidays. While Statehood Day (Dan državnosti), July 13, is regarded as the most signifi cant holiday in Montenegro by 40.1 percent of the overall population, which includes 43 percent of those who identifi ed as Montenegrin and 38 percent of those who identifi ed as Serb, opinion was very divided as to Independence Day (Dan neza- 
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Such polarization regarding state holidays is related to the divide over statehood and identity and as such represents another political indicator of the Montenegrin identity schema's reconstruction. Statehood Day is broadly supported because it marks the day Montenegrin statehood was recognized at the 1878 Congress of Berlin. Moreover, on 13 July 1941 the people of Montenegro started their fi ght for liberation in WWII. Hence, it refers to two historical events and is interchangeably referred to as "Statehood Day" and "Rebellion Day."
54 By contrast, Independence Day marks the date of the 2006 referendum. As a consequence of this association, and the victory of the DPS-led pro-independence camp (also rhetorically branded the pro-Montenegrin camp), this holiday is celebrated by 79 percent of those who identifi ed themselves as Montenegrin and only 23 percent of those who identifi ed as Serb.
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Therefore, the policies that have been adopted as a part of the DPS's political evolution since 1997 became entrenched in what was reportedly perceived by respondents as political or state-related aspects of the Montenegrin identity. These policies generate bifurcated opinions between those identifying themselves as Montenegrin and those as Serb, and thus they emerge as markers in the reconstruction of the post-Yugoslav Montenegrin identity schema. 
Ethnicized Nation Building
The reconstruction of the meaning of Montenegrin has also entailed changes to those elements of the identity schema which are perceived as ethnocultural. As a consequence of the split created in Montenegrin society by the divide over statehood and identity, the ruling elites adopted several symbolic policies in an attempt to consolidate their vision of independent statehood with that of a separate Montenegrin identity. The most signifi cant among these policies were those related to religion, state symbols, and language. The policies adopted with respect to each of these had diff erent backgrounds and goals, which can explain the diff ering degrees of popular support they have attracted. While the main aim of the religious policies has been to broaden the support for the DPS-led independence project, the policies on language and state symbols have been adopted predominantly as markers of diff erentiation between the Montenegrin and Serb identity schemas.
Religion in the Process of Identity Reconstruction
Aft er the fall of the socialist regime, religious identifi cation emerged as a pillar of the new identities across the Balkan region. positioning. Thus, religion became an important marker of the ethnonational identity schemas in the newly established post-Yugoslav states.
In the case of Montenegro, religious association as a by-product of politics (or, as Sabrina Ramet would term it, an "epipolitical phenomenon"), and not purely religious belief as such, became an identity marker. 57 Throughout most of the 1990s the government of Montenegro supported the Serbian Orthodox Church (Srpska pravoslavna crkva, SPC). Yet, with the change in the political landscape aft er 1997, the offi cial policy of the ruling Montenegrin elites had been detachment from the SPC, aimed at ensuring broader support in the opposition to Milošević. With the quest for independence, this detachment intensifi ed, because the SPC insisted on Conversely, the role of the church among supporters of the pro-independence DPS was not emphasized to the same extent. Supporters of the DPS, which advocated independent statehood in the 2006 Montenegrin referendum, oft en identifi ed themselves with the Serbian rather than the Montenegrin Orthodox Church (Crnogorska Pravoslavna Crkva, CPC).
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As an institutional epiphenomenon, the CPC challenged the religious domination of the SPC and provided a point of reference for those in the pro-independence camp who cherished religion as a part of their identity but did not want to identify with a church whose name included the term Serb. Moreover, since the Orthodox churches are "national" (autocephalous, not centralized worldwide), for some members of the pro-independence camp the existence of the CPC legitimized the separateness of Montenegrin identity and the quest for statehood.
The 2011 survey data show that more Montenegrins felt that the Montenegrin rather than the Serbian Orthodox Church should be offi cially recognized in Montenegro-47 percent versus 33 percent.
61
In addition, 63 percent of those who self-identifi ed as Montenegrin believed that the authorities treat all the re- This lower degree of trust in the ruling government among the latter population is arguably a consequence of a series of policies that were directly related to the SPC. In 2005 the SPC unilaterally constructed a metal church on Mount Rumija, claiming that an Orthodox church had existed there until 1571. In 2009 the Montenegrin Ministry for Spatial Planning and Environmental Protection adopted a decree that this church should be demolished, a policy opposed by 37 percent of those who identifi ed as Montenegrin and 71 percent of those who declared themselves Serbs in the 2011 survey.
63
In addition to representing a marker of polarization in terms of people's identity, the question of the church on Mount Rumija also resulted in a criminal complaint for hate speech fi led against the Serbian Orthodox Metropolitan of Montenegro and the Littoral, Amfi lohije, who issued a formal anathema against those who sought to demolish the church.
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This policy also indicates the change in the meaning of the Montenegrin identity schema and its detachment from the Serb one. In fact, 41 percent of those who reported seeing themselves as Montenegrin in the 2011 survey supported the criminal charges, in contrast to 6 percent of those who declared themselves Serb.
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In addition to diff erentiating the categories of Serb and Montenegrin, the plethora of policies adopted by the government of Montenegro in relation 62. Ibid., 47. 63. Ibid., 51. 64. Srđan Janković, "Amfi lohije bacio anatemu i za božićne praznike," Radio Slobodna Evropa, 10 January 2011, at www.slobodnaevropa.org/content/sve_amfi lofi jeve_ kletve/2271881.html (last accessed 1 March 2014).
65. Ipsos Strategic Marketing, "Report: Nation Building-Montenegro," 52.
to religion have ostensibly been inclusive toward the Bosniak community, 79 percent of whose members identifi ed with Islam in religious terms. 66 The responses to religion-related questions from those who declared themselves Bosniaks show a closer correlation with the category of Montenegrin than with that of Serb, with 29 percent supporting the demolition of the chapel on Mount Rumija and 44 percent supporting the criminal complaint against Metropolitan Amfi lohije for hate speech. 67 Likewise, 96 percent of the surveyed Bosniaks held that a Montenegrin may also be a Muslim, which indicates that they generally perceive the Montenegrin identity category as being inclusive. However, the degree to which Montenegrin Muslims are accepted by non-Muslim Montenegrins was only 65 percent.
68 This indicates that the religious inclusiveness of the Montenegrin schema promoted by the ruling elites attracted the support of the non-Orthodox community, while those who identifi ed as Christians remained divided as to whether the non-Orthodox living in Montenegro could be considered Montenegrins.
How to Symbolize a Nation? State Symbols and Language as Elements of Diff erentiation
The implicit meanings of the symbols of a state, like the fl ag, the coat of arms, or the national anthem, have oft en been connected to the history of the people in question.
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And, indeed, symbols proved important in the reconstruction of the Montenegrin identity schema during the debate over statehood and identity. A law on Montenegrin national symbols was passed in 2004 that indicated another push of the ruling elites toward independence. Article 4 of the 2004 Law on State Symbols, also applied aft er independence, describes the coat of arms of Montenegro as "a golden-crowned double-headed eagle with its wings in fl ight, with a scepter in its right claw and an orb in its left , on a red base. On the eagle's chest is a shield with a golden lion passant. The lion is on a green fi eld with a blue background. The crown above the eagle's heads and the scepter are gold topped with a cross. The orb is blue with golden sheaths and cross."
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As stipulated in Article 5 of the same law, the fl ag of Montenegro is to be red, bordered in gold, and with the coat of arms in the middle. The defi nitions of the symbols were subject to contestation among the political representatives and followers of the two blocs, a debate that is still ongoing in public discussions. In the 2011 survey, 90 percent of those who identifi ed themselves as Montenegrin approved of the offi cial fl ag of Montenegro, as opposed to 39 percent of those who saw themselves as Serb."
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The latter felt that a break with history had been made, as the traditional Montenegrin fl ag 66. Ipsos Strategic Marketing, "Report: Nation Building-Montenegro," 44. Please note that although there is also a national category of Muslims in Montenegro, the survey had not diff erentiated between Bosniaks and Muslims. had been red, blue, and white, like the Serbian one, with a white eagle (also similar to the Serbian coat of arms).
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Moreover, the new Montenegrin fl ag was used by the pro-independence camp in the pre-referendum campaign, linking it closely to the Montenegrin identity schema. Consequently, in 2010 the political parties representing the Serbs in Montenegro requested the reintroduction of the tricolored fl ag.
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Article 6 of the same law identifi es the national anthem as "Oh, Bright Dawn of May" ("Oj, svijetla majska zoro"), a point that provoked a similar degree of polarization among the people. The 2011 survey shows that 89 percent of those who identifi ed as Montenegrin liked the national anthem, as opposed to only 41 percent of those who declared themselves to be Serb.
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The anthem proved particularly divisive due to the association of two of its verses with the WWII Montenegrin nationalist movement, the Greens (Zelenaši), affi liated with fascism and fascist Italy. The interwar leader of this movement, Sekula Drljević, composed two verses of the anthem, which are now controversial due to his authorship. Similar to the case of the national fl ag, Montenegro's opposition parties-the SNP and NOVA-sought to have these lines deleted from the national anthem.
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Language has been an additional ethnocultural symbol in the reconstruc- tion of the Montenegrin identity schema. This question is inextricably related to the education system, the press, and the general transmission of ideas, as recognized by most of the academic work on nationalism and identity.
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In the Balkans, ever since the romantic idea of unifying the South Slavs emerged in the mid-nineteenth century, language has been an important aspect of how people viewed themselves. 77 Especially aft er the events of the 1990s, language acquired a political dimension and became related to territory-to the "political organization of space."
78 "Nationalizing" the language thus became one of the policies of the government of Montenegro.
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According to Article 9 of the 1992 Constitution of Montenegro, the "language in offi cial use" in Montenegro is the Ijekavski dialect of Serbian.
80 Prior to Yugoslavia's disintegration, the offi cial language of the federation was SerboCroatian. Both the Cyrillic and the Latin scripts, religiously, culturally, and politically symbolizing the eastern (thus Christian Orthodox) and western (thus Catholic, or mixed) republics of Yugoslavia, respectively, were in use. Aft er the breakup of the federation, the successor states enshrined separate languages, named aft er the given state, in their constitutions, along with the corresponding script.
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In the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRJ), and in Montenegro, the offi cial language remained Serbian. However, unlike the FRJ constitution, which gave clear precedence to Cyrillic (Article 15), the 1992 Constitution of Montenegro equalized the Cyrillic and the Latin scripts (Article 9). There are two reasons for Montenegro's retention of the Serbian language and both scripts in 1992. First, the Montenegrin political elites were close to those in Serbia in the early 1990s, which explains the use of the Serbian language in Montenegro during that period. The use of both scripts in Montenegro has been retained due to the particular ethnopolitical composition of the country and the cultural and historical signifi cance of both Cyrillic and Latin. Second, in none of the previous Yugoslav constitutions had the language been termed Montenegrin. It was natural to call the language Serbian, since the joint state continued to exist.
According to Article 13 of the 2007 Constitution of Montenegro, the "offi cial language in Montenegro is Montenegrin," with "Serbian, Bosnian, Al-banian, and Croatian" as "offi cially used languages." 82 As recorded in the 2003 census, 59.67 percent of the population claimed to speak Serbian, while 21.53 percent listed their language as Montenegrin.
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In 2011, 42.88 percent of the people declared that their native language was Serbian and 36.97 percent that it was Montenegrin.
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Data from the 2011 survey show that 69 percent of those who declared themselves Montenegrin said they spoke Montenegrin: they used it in the census and in offi cial documentation. This sharply distinguishes them from those who declared themselves Serb, 97 percent of whom said they used the Serbian language.
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In July 2009 Montenegro's Ministry of Education and Science adopted new orthographic norms, according to which the Montenegrin alphabet now no longer has thirty graphemes but thirty-two (with the addition of ś and ź). Montenegro is the only former Yugoslav successor state to have altered its alphabet. This policy was supported by only 35.7 percent of the population: 51 percent of the self-identifi ed Montenegrins and 4 percent of the Serbs. These fi gures suggest that the linguistic aspect of the Montenegrin identity schema's reconstruction was less than successful, because a signifi cant percentage of those who identifi ed themselves as Montenegrin did not support all the government's nation-building policies. The dynamics of support for various policies adopted by the government of Montenegro is also refl ected in the loyalty index computed by the Political Science Research Centre (CPI) in Zagreb. Under the auspices of the "Symbolic Nation-Building in the West Balkans" project, the CPI constructed a loyalty index based on the responses to fourteen questions in the 2011 survey. The fourteen questions, each representing a loyalty variable across all seven former Yugoslav countries, were selected by the expert coding task group. The variables were selected to represent the individuals' attitudes toward the state and those toward the state authorities' offi cial nation-building project. The variables were generated through questions based on which country the respondents regarded as their homeland; whether they would live in that country for the rest of their lives or emigrate (two questions); whether they were proud to be the citizens of their country; which identity-civic or ethnic-was more important to them; whether the respondents approved of the country's offi cial fl ag and national anthem (two questions); whether they felt the authorities' policies and actions made them feel included and as though they belonged in the country, treated all ethnic and religious communities equally, and presented the country's history in an accurate and appropriate way (four questions); whether any part of the country should be allowed to secede; and how the respondents evaluated the interethnic relations in their country at present and as compared to ten years prior (two questions). Responses to each question were coded as follows: 1 for full support (0.5 for partial support), -1 for full rejection (-0.5 for partial rejection), and 0 for neither support nor rejection. Hence, the scale ranged from -14 to +14, with 0 as the neutrality point.
The overall loyalty score for Montenegro, presented in fi gure 8, stands at 4.57-the second lowest in the western Balkans (though signifi cantly higher than the lowest, which was for Bosnia and Herzegovina, at 0.56). Although the CPI score places Montenegro closer to the other western Balkan states, which scored between 5.17 (Serbia) and 6.94 (Kosovo), there were signifi cant diff erences in support between the various ethnic groups.
As argued throughout this article, support for Montenegro's offi cial nation-building policies has been professed by those who ascribe themselves to Montenegrin and Bosniak identity schemas. Figure 9 indicates the loyalty index of these two categories: 6.42 and 6.76, respectively. Interestingly, those who identify as Bosniak show slightly greater loyalty to the nation-building policies than those who see themselves as Montenegrin. This corroborates the interpretation that the ruling elite have pushed forward an inclusive agenda aimed specifi cally at attracting minority votes. By contrast, and unsurprisingly, the loyalty score of those who identifi ed as Serb stands at -0.34, indicating that members of that category are not supportive of Montenegro's offi cial nation-building agenda. On the other hand, since the results for this group lie just below the neutrality point, it could also indicate that this population is likely to challenge some aspects of the dominant nation-building project, as in the case of the national symbols.
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The results of the censuses conducted aft er the Yugoslav breakup reveal a signifi cant change in the meaning of Montenegrin identity. Looking at national identity as an abstract category that is simultaneously cognitive and relational, this article has provided explanations for the opportunities and constraints that aff ected this identity change, in particular by focusing on the success of the nationalizing policies of the government of Montenegro. I began by proposing a theoretical framework for examining changes in Montenegrin identity and, using original quantitative data, followed up by investigating the reasons behind popular support for specifi c policies that helped change this identity.
The alterations to the Montenegrin identity schema were induced by the eff ects of the broader political environment in the post-Yugoslav space on the local competition for political power. As long as the ruling DPS elites supported Milošević's politics, the Montenegrin identity schema remained closely 87. Milošević, "Fate of Montenegro's State Symbols in Balance." related to that of Serbia. Aft er the split of the DPS in 1997, which triggered internal power struggles, the ruling elites adopted a series of policies aimed at distancing Montenegro from the FRJ institutions. Even though these policies did not initially have nation building as their main aim, they were integrated into the political aspects of the Montenegrin identity schema. The 2011 survey reveals sharp polarization between the Serb and Montenegrin categories in terms of attitudes toward the state, the ICTY, Montenegro's foreign policy allies, and political issues such as the apology to Croatia for war crimes. This indicates that the cognition of Montenegrin nationhood was changed by the alteration of a political frame-from closeness to Serbia to distancing and detachment from it.
We have seen how the reconstruction of the meaning of being Montenegrin was made possible due to the existence of historical narratives, which resonated in recent political discourse and were used to support or contest the claims of the two competing political camps. Historical ambiguity about national identity in Montenegro provided enough reference for the rival elites to fi nd historical justifi cations for their claims related to either independent Montenegrin statehood and separate Montenegrin identity or to the unifi cation with Serbia and the blurred lines between Serb and Montenegrin identities. Precisely because of these historical ambiguities, the ruling elite resorted to policies of nationalization aft er their turn toward independence. These policies were used to demarcate the Montenegrin identity category from the Serb. Policies on religion had a twofold aim. While separating the Montenegrin and Serb elements of identity through acceptance of the CPC, the Montenegrin ruling elite also sought to attract the non-Orthodox population to the cause of independence and therefore distanced themselves from the SPC. In consequence, the Montenegrin identity schema became less related to religion.
The combination of political and ethnic elements in the Montenegrin identity schema induced a shift in the cognition of what it means to be Montenegrin. This has had two implications. First, this process has dismantled the conjoined Montenegrin/Serbian homo duplex construct, largely through the nationalizing policies that served to demarcate the Montenegrin and Serb aspects of identity. Second, as the 2011 survey showed, the polarization of the populace into Montenegrin and Serb categories follows the identity divide made clear in the 2003 and 2011 censuses. However, not all those who considered themselves Montenegrin in 1991 reported doing so in 2011, which indicates that ascription to identity categories is in fl ux.
Conceptually, the case of Montenegro helps us understand how individuals identify nationally by ascribing themselves to abstract communities, which they perceive as refl ective of communal bonds. The individuals' perceptions of these communities can be altered if the frames for the cognition of national identities change through political action or broader social developments. The change in these frames does not change an individual's ethnonational belonging. Rather, it transforms the content and the meaning of identity categories, the perception of what "a nation" stands for, thus allowing individuals to associate with or dissociate from it.
